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Abstract
The optimal merger policy when e±ciency gains are not merger speci¯c but can
also be achieved through licensing is derived in a di®erentiated goods Cournot duopoly.
We show that whenever both royalties and fees are feasible instruments to license
technology, mergers should not be allowed, which ¯ts the prescription of the U.S.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. When only one instrument is feasible, however, the
possibility of licensing cannot be used as a de¯nitive argument against mergers.
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Nowadays, companies all over the world seem to have an insatiable appetite for mergers, with
the goal of capturing complementarities, scale economies, integrating technologies and pro-
duction facilities and achieving cost e±ciencies. This phenomenon demands a severe control
by antitrust authorities to prevent anticompetitive behaviors. Until 1997, Section 5 of the
1992 U.S Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG), prescribed to forbid mergers whenever the
e±ciency gains were less than their competitive risks or whenever \equivalent or comparable
savings can reasonably be achieved by the parties through other means". In April 1997,
this section on e±ciencies was extended to explicitly include among them the possibility
of licensing.1 This is probably due to the increasing importance played by licensing in the
di®usion of new technologies in the last few years. For example, Arora and Fosfuri (1998)
document a widespread incidence of licensing in the chemical industry. Anand and Khanna
(1997) report that licensing is also very common in biotechnology and ¯nd that licensing has
increased in frequency between 1990-1993 (the time period of their study). Finally, evidence
of the importance of licensing in computers, automotive, biopharmaceuticals, engineering
and electronics is also reported in di®erent surveys.
In this paper we evaluate the accuracy of the HMG prescription. To address this issue,
the optimal merger policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger to transfer a superior
technology is derived. We focus on a simple case in which both instruments are assumed to
allow the perfect and complete transmission of the innovation. In other words, we consider
both instruments equivalent from a technological point of view, ignoring problems of asym-
metric information between licensor and licensee, as well as the possibility that a merger can
create synergies that could give a merger a technological advantage over licensing. Consid-
ering licensing and mergers technologically equivalent, while making the analysis tractable,
will not signi¯cantly a®ect the qualitative results we obtain. Its main consequence will be
that, when deriving the optimal merger policy in this setting, we will never be too permissive
1\The agency will not deem e±ciencies to be merger speci¯c if they could be preserved by practical
alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or licensing."
2with respect to mergers.
The crucial aspect we focus on in this work is that licensing and merging arenot equivalent
regimes with respect to their impact on competition. A merger eliminates competition but
e±ciency gains are completely exploited by the emerging monopoly when deciding outputs.
On the other hand, under licensing market competition remains but the licensee's output
is distorted, as the optimal licensing contract always includes a royalty. We compare social
welfare under both policies in a di®erentiated goods Cournot duopoly, which allows us to
derive the optimal merger policy, and to check whether that policy ¯ts the prescription of the
HMG. We show that, regardless of the type of competition, the optimal merger policy ¯ts
the prescription of the HMG whenever both ¯xed fees and royalties are feasible instruments
to license the superior technology. Otherwise, we show that the HMG is too restrictive
because it could lead to forbid welfare improving mergers. In particular, when royalties are
not feasible due for example to lack of veri¯ability of the licensee's output, the HMG is too
restrictive because large enough innovations make licensing unpro¯table for the patentee. On
the other hand, if only royalties are feasible due for example to existing riskiness associated to
the innovation that precludes the use of fees, the patentee tends to charge a greater royalty,
distorting even more the licensee's output and thus additionally reducing welfare.
Regarding existing literature on mergers, Salant et al. (1983) showed that mergers can
be unpro¯table in a symmetric Cournot setting and Perry and Porter (1985) that e±ciency
gains can make mergers pro¯table. Regarding welfare consequences of mergers, Farrell and
Shapiro (1990) derived conditions based on market shares of ¯rms under which a merger
increases welfare. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the ¯rst paper that derives
the optimal merger policy when licensing is a substitute of a merger to transfer a superior
technology.
On the other hand, the licensing literature has mainly focused on the performance of ¯xed
fees and royalties as instruments to market cost-reducing innovations. Kamien and Tauman
(1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986), ignoring information problems, show that licensing by
means of a ¯xed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for an external laboratory,
3in a homogeneous goods Cournot oligopoly. Muto (1993) extends those works to the case
of Bertrand competition and shows that for the case of close substitute goods a royalty can
be superior to a fee. On the other hand, for the case of an internal patentee, Katz and
Shapiro (1985) analyze ¯xed fees in a homogeneous goods Cournot duopoly, showing that
licensing a cost-reducing innovation is not always pro¯table for the patentee. Wang (1998)
extends their analysis to the comparison between fees and royalties and shows that a royalty
is always superior to a fee for the patentee. Finally, Faul¶ i-Oller and Sandon¶ is (1999) extend
the set of feasible contracts to allow for the possibility that both fees and royalties can be
simultaneously used and derive the optimal two-part tari® licensing contract in a di®eren-
tiated goods duopoly for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Including asymmetric
information problems, Gallini and Wright (1990), Macho-Stadler and P¶ erez-Castrillo (1991)
and Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) show that both fees and royalties should be included in
the optimal licensing contracts. Royalties are useful either to signal good innovations or to
separate the potential licensees that are willing to pay more for the innovation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the optimal merger policy for the case of Cournot competition and analyzes under
what circumstances it ¯ts the prescription of the HMG. Finally, a section with the main
conclusions closes the paper.
2. The model
We consider two ¯rms, denoted by i = 1,2, each producing a di®erentiated good (goods 1
and 2 respectively). They face inverse demand functions given by:
pi = 1 ¡ xi ¡°xj;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j;
where ° 2 [0;1] and represents the degree of product di®erentiation. Following Singh and
Vives (1984), these demands come from the maximization problem of a representative con-
sumer with utility separable in money (m) given by:
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1 ¡ °2 + °
pj
1 ¡ °2;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:
Firm 2 has constant unit production costs of c2: Firm 1 is assumed to have a patented
process innovation that allows to produce good 1 at a lower marginal cost c1, that we set,
without loss of generality, to be zero. Two di®erent mechanisms to transfer the superior
technology to ¯rm 2 are considered: a licensing agreement and a merger. Both mechanisms
are assumed to reduce the marginal cost of producing good 2 to zero, that is, we ignore
problems of asymmetric information between the contracting parties in licensing agreements
and the possibility that a merger creates synergies.
Depending on the size of the innovation we will distinguish between drastic and non-
drastic innovations. We will call an innovation drastic when ¯rm 1 may monopolize its
market. In particular, this is the case if c2 > cM




Let us de¯ne the social welfare function as
W(x1;x2) = u(x1;x2) ¡ c1x1 ¡ c2x2:
The timing of the game is the following:
In the ¯rst stage, the antitrust authority decides whether or not to allow mergers. In the
second stage, the ¯rms have the possibility to merge (if allowed in the ¯rst stage), or to sign
a licensing contract. Given this decision, market competition takes place in the third stage,
with the cost functions inherited from the second stage. We solve by backwards induction,
obtaining the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the proposed game.
We will consider three di®erent licensing scenarios: two-part tari® (f;r) licensing con-
tracts, royalty (r) contracts and fee (f) contracts, where f represents a °at lump-sum license
fee and r represents a per unit of output fee (royalty). Scenario 2 arises when riskiness asso-
ciated to the innovation precludes the use of fees. Scenario 3, when royalties are not feasible
due, for example, to lack of veri¯ability of the licensee's output. Otherwise, scenario 1 arises.
The licensing game is modelled as follows: ¯rst, the patentee makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er
to ¯rm 2; second, this ¯rm accepts or rejects the contract. We do not allow for negative
5fees because, otherwise, as argued by Katz and Shapiro (1985), contracts would include the
possibility for the patent holder to \bribe(s) ¯rm 2 to exit the industry...and would likely be
held to be illegal by antitrust authorities."2 It should be noted that the licensee's marginal
cost whenever a royalty is included in the licensing contract (scenarios 1 and 2) is given by
r and thus, the patentee plays the role of a leader, as he determines the reaction function
of the licensee by deciding the royalty to be included in the contract. On the other hand,
under fee licensing (scenario 3) or under a merger, ¯rm 2's marginal cost becomes zero.
Next section derives the optimal merger policy under the three possible licensing scenar-
ios.
3. The optimal merger policy
We start by calculating the third stage ¯rms' Nash equilibrium outputs, pro¯ts and total
incomes, given that ¯rm 2 has accepted a (f;r) contract. They are given, respectively, by:
x1(r) = minf
2 ¡ °(1 ¡ r)
4 ¡ °2 ;
1
2g; x2(r) = maxf
2(1 ¡ r) ¡ °
4 ¡ °2 ; 0g;
¼1(r) = x1(r)2; ¼2(r) = x2(r)2;
¦1(r;f) = ¼1(r) + rx2(r) + f; ¦2(r;f) = ¼2(r) ¡ f:
By substituting c2 for r in the above expressions, the equilibrium outputs and pro¯ts
under the status quo situation are obtained. Notice that when ¯rm 2 is not active, ¯rm one
produces the monopoly output x1 = 1=2:













Notice that merging is always preferred to licensing by the ¯rms because while both poli-
cies transfer the superior technology a merger, in addition, eliminates market competition.
2Notice that we do allow for contracts including negative royalties. Nevertheless, for the case of substitute
goods, it is never optimal for the patentee to charge a negative royalty. This would be the case, however, for
complementary goods, that are not considered in this work.
6Therefore, if allowed by the antitrust authority, the ¯rms will always choose to merge.3
We start the analysis by scenario 1, comparing two-part tari® licensing with a merger.
3.1. Merging vs. two-part tari® licensing
First of all, two-part tari® licensing is always pro¯table for the patentee because it may
always reproduce the status quo by setting a royalty that just equals the reduction in unit
costs that the licensee achieves on account of the new technology. This would leave the
licensee indi®erent between licensing or not, and let the licensor enjoy the gains from the
licensee's improved e±ciency.4 On the other hand, two-part tari® licensing is also welfare
improving because it never reduces competition, provided that the royalty cannot exceed c2.
Therefore, in order for the antitrust authority to prescribe when a merger should be allowed
it has to compare the licensing policy and a merger from a social point of view.
First of all, we have to obtain the optimal two-part tari® licensing contract (the contract
that maximizes the patentee's total income). As shown in Faul¶ i-Oller and Sandon¶ is (1999)









For the sake of completeness, the proof is included in the Appendix.
Observe that for the case of homogenous products (° = 1), r00
c = cM
2 ; which implies that
drastic innovations (c2 ¸ cM
2 ) are not licensed (see Wang, 1998). However, whenever ° < 1;
even drastic innovations are licensed because, in that case, r00
c < cM
2 :
3Because we are interested in the social welfare consequences of mergers, we will not enter into the
analysis of how the merging ¯rms share monopoly pro¯ts. However, intuitively, the technologically superior
¯rm would not accept less than what she could guarantee under the optimal licensing contract and, the other
¯rm, should receive not less than what she would receive in that case. Provided that monopoly pro¯ts are
never less than the joint pro¯ts under the optimal licensing contract, a merger agreement would always be
feasible.
4In fact, strictly speaking, two-part tari® licensing only guarantees non-negative pro¯ts for the patentee
because, as we will see later, for large enough innovations particular cases exist such that the patentee is
indi®erent between licensing and the status quo.
7In order to prescribe when mergers should be allowed in this scenario, let us ¯rst denote
by Wm;Wu and W r social welfare under a Merger, under the optimal Unrestricted royalty
(r¤ = r00













Next proposition derives the optimal merger policy for scenario 1.
Proposition 3.1. When two-part tari® licensing contracts are feasible, mergers should
never be allowed.
Proof. First, for c2 · r00
c; a merger is socially preferred to a royalty regime if W m ¡ W r is
positive. Directly comparing the corresponding expressions results in that W m ¸ W r if and
only if c2 ¸ cmc








c we obtain cmc
2 ¸ r00
c; which implies that for c2 < r00
c; licensing
is always socially preferred to a merger. Second, for c2 ¸ r00
c; welfare under royalty licensing
is constant in c2: As welfare under a merger does not depend on c2, in order to compare
both regimes in this region we just need to know the sign of W m ¡W r evaluated in c2 = r00
c:
But we know that at this point licensing is socially preferred to a merger, which closes the
proof.
The result in Proposition 3.1 exactly ¯ts the prescription of the U.S. merger guidelines:
when the e±ciency gains are not merger speci¯c and can be also attained through licensing,
mergers should be forbidden. Notice that the result arises in a context in which both ¯xed
fees and royalties are feasible. This requires output to be veri¯able and uncertainty low
enough as not to preclude the use of royalties and ¯xed fees, respectively. We will next
proceed to derive the optimal merger policy in scenarios 2 and 3.
3.2. Merging vs. royalty licensing
As licensing by means of a royalty is always pro¯table for the licensor as well as welfare
improving, in order to prescribe when a merger should be allowed in this scenario it is
su±cient to compare royalty licensing and a merger from a social point of view.
8Next proposition shows the optimal royalty contract (the contract that maximizes the
patentee's total income).







(2 ¡ °)(4 + 2° ¡ °2)
2(8 ¡ 3°2)
:
Proof. The optimal royalty solves:
maxrf¼1(r) + rx2(r)g
s:t: r · c2:
Direct resolution of this problem results in the optimal contract shown in theproposition.
Next proposition derives the optimal merger policy for scenario 2 by direct comparison
of welfare under both regimes:
Proposition 3.3. When only a royalty can be included in the licensing contract, a threshold
value cmc
2 exists such that a merger should be allowed if and only if c2 ¸ cmc
2 .
Proof. First, observe that for c2 · r0
c; we are in the case of restricted royalty and in this
case we compute W m ¡ W r ¸ 0 if c2 ¸ cmc
2 , where cmc
2 has been de¯ned in Proposition 3.1.
Second, comparing cmc
2 and r0




2 . This implies that
for c2 < cmc
2 , licensing is socially preferred to a merger and for c2 ¸ cmc
2 a merger is socially
preferred to licensing.
This proposition shows that licensing by means of a royalty is not always socially preferred
to a merger. The reason is that the patentee must use the only feasible instrument (the
royalty) not only to soften competition but also to appropriate the surplus generated by the
superior technology, which results in a higher royalty, in a higher distortion in the licensee's
output, and lower social welfare.
3.3. Merging vs. ¯xed fee licensing
Licensing by means of a fee is pro¯table whenever it increases industry pro¯ts. As shown by
Katz and Shapiro (1985) for the case of homogeneous goods, for large enough innovations
9the e±ciency gains can be more than compensated by the rent dissipation e®ect, making
duopoly pro¯ts decrease. In these cases, licensing will not occur and a merger becomes the
only alternative to transfer technology. Next proposition characterizes the conditions under
which ¯xed fee licensing is pro¯table for the patentee.
Proposition 3.4. A threshold value cL
2 exists such that if ° · °, licensing by means of a
fee is always pro¯table; if ° > °; it is pro¯table if and only if c2 · cL
2; where ° = 0:82:
Proof. Directly comparing industry pro¯ts under fee licensing with the status quo situation,




2(4 ¡ 4° + °2)
4 + °2 :
When the goods are close substitutes (° > 0:82), licensing is pro¯table only for small
innovations. Otherwise (° · 0:82), licensing is pro¯table regardless of the size of the innova-
tion. This result is very intuitive: when the goods are very di®erentiated, market competition
is not intense and, therefore, the e±ciency gains more than compensate the rent dissipation
e®ect produced by the license, making licensing always pro¯table.
In the ¯rst stage of the game, the antitrust authority has to decide whether or not
to allow mergers. We have to take into account that licensing by means of a fee is always
socially preferred to a merger because, whereas both regimes achieve the same e±ciency gain
a merger, additionally, erodes competition. Therefore, mergers should be allowed whenever
licensing is not pro¯table for the patentee and a merger improves welfare with respect to
the technological status quo. Next proposition compares social welfare under a merger and
under the status quo situation.
Proposition 3.5. A threshold value cm
2 exists such that regardless of the degree of product
di®erentiation, a merger is socially pro¯table if and only if c2 ¸ cm
2 .







The above proposition shows that for large enough innovations and regardless of the de-
gree of product di®erentiation, the e±ciency gains attained through a merger compensate for
10its anticompetitive e®ect, thus making mergers socially desirable. Observe that Proposition
3.5 can be seen as the optimal merger policy when the e±ciency gains attained through a
merger are merger speci¯c.
Next proposition combines Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 to derive the optimal merger policy
for scenario 3.
Proposition 3.6. When only a fee can be included in the licensing contract, mergers should
be allowed if and only if ° > ° and c2 ¸ cL
2:
Proof. Whenever licensing is not privately pro¯table and mergers are socially preferred
to the status quo, mergers should be allowed. This proposition just brings together the




Summarizing, from the optimal merger policies derived in Propositions 3.1, 3.3 and 3.6,
an interesting policy implication can be derived. When licensing is an alternative to a
merger for (perfectly) transferring technology, a more restrictive optimal merger policy is
called for. This argument seems to be present in the HMG, that prescribes to forbid mergers
whenever the e±ciency gains can be alternatively achieved through licensing. The optimal
merger policy derived above ¯ts that prescription only when both ¯xed fees and royalties
are feasible instruments to license the superior technology. Otherwise, the possibility of
licensing cannot be used as a de¯nitive argument against mergers. In particular, it may be
too restrictive because it may lead to forbid welfare improving mergers: in scenario 2, it may
occur because the patentee imposes a high royalty that distorts the licensee's output a lot
and reduces welfare. On the other hand, in scenario 3 because, as Proposition 3.4 shows, fee
licensing is not always pro¯table and, in these cases, a merger is the only e®ective instrument
to transfer technology.
114. Conclusions
The traditional merger policy analysis prescribes to allow mergers if and only if e±ciency
gains compensate their impact on competition. In this paper, we extend this analysis by
considering also the existence of an alternative instrument that may allow ¯rms to attain
those e±ciencies, namely, licensing. In this case, a more restrictive merger policy is called
for. The 1992 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines was revised in 1997 to incorporate this idea,
and it prescribes to forbid mergers whenever e±ciency gains are not merger speci¯c, but can
also be achieved through licensing. In this work, we have shown that the prescription of the
HMG is too restrictive. In particular, for large innovations mergers tend to be superior to
licensing: when royalties are not feasible, it is true because large innovations make licensing
unpro¯table and, at the same time, make mergers socially desirable; on the other hand,
when royalties are feasible, because for large innovations the patentee tends to impose high
royalties, reducing total output and welfare.
In absence of licensing, the traditional merger policy is more restrictive the less di®er-
entiated the goods are. This is still true when royalties are feasible. When only fees are
feasible, however, the result is reversed: mergers should be allowed only when the goods are
close substitutes. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that what determines the
merger policy in this case is whether licensing is pro¯table or not. It turns out that it is not
pro¯table when goods are close substitutes.
Finally, an interesting extension of the model is to derive the optimal merger policy for
the case of Bertrand competition. This is in fact work in progress. The results obtained in
Bertrand are qualitatively similar to those in Cournot. They incorporate, however, the fact
that Bertrand competition is more intense, which implies ¯rst, that the licensor tends to
impose greater royalties in order to soften competition and, second, that mergers are more
anticompetitive. While under Cournot licensing is always pro¯table for the patentee, under
Bertrand competition and even when both instruments are feasible, for large enough inno-
vations licensing becomes non-pro¯table for the patentee, that uses the royalty to keep the
other ¯rm out of the market. In these cases, a merger becomes the only e®ective instrument
12to transfer the superior technology and thus, it should be allowed whenever it is welfare
improving.
5. Appendix
Derivation of the optimal two-part tari® licensing contract
The optimal two-part tari® licensing contract solves:
maxr;ff¼1(r) + rx2(r) + fg
s:t: f · ¼2(r) ¡ ¼2(c2)
f ¸ 0:
This program can be rewritten in a simpli¯ed way. As the ¯rst constraint is always
binding, it can be substituted in the objective function and the second constraint can be
replaced with r · c2; that guarantees that the fee is never negative. The maximization
problem thus becomes:
maxrf¼1(r) + rx2(r) + ¼2(r) ¡ ¼2(c2)g
s:t: r · c2:
Solving this program directly results in the optimal contract shown in the proposition.
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